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CGIAR’s CENTRAL STRUCTURE: 
Is THERE NEED FOR CHANGE? 
Introduction 
The CGIAR is in the midst of change. The environment within which the system functions has 
been changing, most notably the financial environment; and the system has begun adjusting itself in order 
to enhance its relevance and effectiveness. The system’s future success will depend, to a large extent, 
on its ability to manage this process of change or adjustment effectively. 
This paper explores three central questions related to change management: (1) Does the CGIAR 
have adequate instruments at the system level to manage change? (2) Does the CGIAR have adequate 
instruments at the system level to manage its ongoing business? (3) Are these instruments cost effective 
and efficient? 
These questions are raised now because the creation of the Oversight and Finance Committees 
inject new elements into the central structure and have some effect on how pre-existing elements will 
function, and because answers to them might influence the way in which the CGIAR might handle 
succession in TAC chairmanship, which is scheduled for beginning of 1995. 
The CGIAR’s present governance and support structure is essentially the same as the initial. This 
basic structure is made up of four components: 
1. The Consultative Group serves as the system-wide deliberation and decision-making 
body of the CGIAR. It is made up of a Chairman, Co-sponsors, donors, and fixed-term 
representatives. The Consultative Group is an informal association, has no legal 
personality, and its decisions are taken on a consensus basis. Two recently established 
committees, an Oversight Committee and a Finance Committee, facilitate the conduct of 
business by the Group. 
2. International centers serve as the operating arm of the system. Each center is an 
autonomous entity with international legal personality, and is managed by a self- 
perpetuating governing board. 
3. Central units advise and assist the Consultative Group in its decision-making and 
implementation. These include the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), the TAC 
Secretariat at FAO in Rome, and the Secretariat of the Consultative Group at the World 
Bank in Washington, D.C. 
4. Partners and clients share purposes similar to those of the Consultative Group and 
collaborate with donors and centers in the carrying out of the activities supported by the 
CGIAR. 
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Aspects of this structural arrangement have been examined in several ad hoc consultations, 
studies and reviews over the last 5 years, including the reviews of the CGIAR Secretariat and the TAC 
Secretariat (1988 and 1989, respectively), an ad hoc consultation on matters of CGIAR strategy (London, 
1992), and a CGIAR Working Group on Deliberation and Decision-Making (1993). More recently, TAC 
has completed its system-wide analysis of the medium-term program and budget proposals of the 
international centers, with implications for the structure of the center system, and the Oversight 
Committee has flagged a number of structural concerns for further examination by the CGIAR. 
Questions about possible directions of change in the CGIAR have been and are being raised 
regarding each of the four components of the system: 
l Structure of the center system. There is increasing pressure within CGIAR to.adjust 
the structure of the center system, if not for any other reason, in order to generate a 
means of adjusting demand for resources so that it will not exceed the expected supply. 
The actions taken in the San Juan meeting of the CGIAR to integrate ILCA and ILRAD 
into a global livestock entity and INIRAP into IBPGR are steps in this direction. TAC’s 
comments on center MTPs also highlight the need for further structural change. The not- 
so-optimistic financial outlook for 1994-98, which will be discussed at the 1993 ICW, 
is likely to force the system to adopt a mechanism for generating specific proposals for 
modifying the structure of the center system. 
While there is uncertainty regarding the future structure of the center system, the model 
of carrying out the CGIAR’s mission through autonomous international centers continues 
to receive strong support. 
l Liukages with partners and clients. CGIAR’s linkages with national agricultural 
research systems (NARS) in developing countries is regarded by some as one of its weak 
points. Questions are raised both about each center’s relationships with NARS as well 
as the centers’ relations as a group with a particular national system. There are also 
uncertainties in many segments within the CGIAR about the operationalization of 
“ecoregional research” and the respective roles of international centers and developing 
country institutions within an ecoregion. On a related matter, representation of 
developing countries within the CGIAR forum in the most effective manner is also being 
probed. The Oversight Committee has initiated an internal examination geared towards 
improving the CGIAR’s linkages with developing countries. 
l Structure of the Consultative Group. For the first time in its history, at its last 
meeting the CGIAR established two standing committees. In addition, it reaffirmed the 
importance it places on decision-making by consensus and endorsed several other 
recommendations of the Working Group on Deliberation and Decision-Making. 
The fourth component, the CGIAR’s central structure, is the main subject of the present paper. 
A central structure made up of a secretariat for the Consultative Group and an independent Technical 
Advisory Committee, with a second secretariat dedicated to facilitate the Committee’s work, has generally 
served the system well during its growth years. Questions are now being raised about the continuing 
appropriateness and efficiency of this structure. The following are among the frequently advanced 
arguments calling for an examination of the CGIAR’s central support structure: 
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l There is need to take a fresh look at all central system-wide units and committees (i.e., 
the Oversight Committee, Finance Committee, TAC, TAC Secretariat, and CGIAR 
Secretariat) so that duplication can be avoided and the CGIAR can be serviced in the 
most efficient manner. 
l The performance of the central structure has been somewhat uneven in recent years in 
carrying out several key central functions. 
l The rationale for having two secretariats in two geographically distant locations should 
be re-examined in the light of the new demands on them. 
CGIAR’s Needs for Central Support 
In reality, the CGIAR operates as a group only two weeks in a year, during its two meetings. 
In the interim, the business of the Group is carried out by the CGIAR Chairman, the two internal CGIAR 
committees, and the central support units. Both the Chairman and the members of the two committees 
carry other, often more pressing, responsibilities in their regular positions and can devote only part of 
their attention to CGIAR matters. Thus, there is need for some permanent structure in the system to 
provide support to the Chairman and the committees and to carry out the continuing business of the 
CGIAR. 
The business of the CGIAR entails the performance of a number of key system-wide functions 
on an ongoing basis. Primary among these are the following: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Ensuring the continuing appropriateness of the long-term vision and the strategic 
directions of the system. 
Ensuring that the CGIAR’s support goes to a set of programs and institutions which 
wiII gnarantee the most efficient use of the CGIAR’s resources. 
Ensuring that, although the CGIAR supports individual institutions or programs, 
their overall effort is welI integrated and mutually supportive. 
Aualyzing the resource needs of the institutions supported by the CGIAR on a 
comparative basis and identifying tradeoffs. 
Ensuring that the CGIAR is appraised of the effectiveness of each institution or 
program it supports on a regular basis so that decisions can be taken vis-a-vis a 
center in a timely manner. 
Supporting the system’s efforts in constituency building and resource mobilization. 
Providing administrative and management support to the CGIAR. 
Analysis of Central Functions 
Would the CGIAR have arrived at the same or a similar structural configuration if it were 
establishing its central mechanisms today, with its new committee structure and the range of issues it 
faces at present? This question can be answered partially by looking at the seven functions noted above 
individually and identifying structural characteristics that may enhance the performance of each. The 
following questions are key in defining these structural characteristics: 
l Would the function be performed better through an internal -or an external effort? 
l Is the effort required in performing the function mostly of a technical nature, or does it 
involve broader policy inputs and analysis? 
l Does the effort require continuous and sustained involvement by a team, or can it be 
performed by part-time or occasional experts? 
The following is a review of each of the seven functions in terms of these structural 
considerations: 
l Vision and strategy. In the final analysis, vision and strategy and changes in them need 
to be endorsed and internalized by the CGIAR, its operating arm and key stakeholders. 
Thus, their involvement is useful and necessary in the formulation and discussion of 
options. It is also necessary to obtain inputs from outside experts on issues like global 
developments in science and technology. 
The inputs required in vision and strategy formulation are not purely technical, they 
involve substantial policy analysis. Regarding continuity, it would be useful to have a 
small core team of people carry continuous responsibility for monitoring developments. 
This team can be expanded as necessary, in particular when major modifications are 
contemplated in vision and strategy, 
l Priorities and structure. Analysis of priorities requires intensive technical inputs & in 
depth knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the existing institutions. Parts of 
this task can be carried out by an external team or by consultants. Recommendations on 
expanding or contracting programs and institutions, or establishing/closing centers require 
careful analysis of and sensitivity to institutional and political concerns. 
l Integration of efforts. This requires, in the first instance, comprehensive knowledge of 
what is to be integrated - i.e., individual programs and institutions supported by the 
CGIAR. In-depth technical knowledge of only one component of the CGIAR is useful, 
but not sufficient in examining the total picture. The task can be performed by an 
internal or external group, provided the individuals in the group have sufficiently detailed 
and up-to-date knowledge of institutions and programs. 
l Resource allocation. This function requires expertise to analyze both the nature of the 
demand for resources and the expected supply, as well as the tradeoffs between 
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alternative allocation patterns. The effort needed is mostly internal and continuous. 
External expertise could be useful in selected technical aspects of the analysis. 
l Accountabilitv. Having the programs and management of individual institutions reviewed 
through external panels of experts is a long-standing tradition in the CGIAR. Although 
there may be ways to simplify the prpcess, having the evaluations conducted by external 
panels is likely to remain the preferred model. Whether these external panels should 
report directly to the CGIAR or, in the first instance, to an external or internal group, 
though, is a question that needs to be answered on efficiency grounds. Appointment of 
the panels, however, can be handled better internally as this process can benefit from 
continuous institutional memory. Having a commentary on a review helps the CGIAR 
focus better on questions requiring CGIAR action. 
l Resource mobilization. Constituency building and fund raising require an internally 
managed effort, with external technical inputs as necessary. Those responsible for 
promoting the CGIAR need to be fully informed of what they are promoting - thus, a 
continuous effort by a knowledgeable core internal group, supported by external technical 
expertise appears to hold promise as a reasonably effective model. 
l Administrative and management su~oort. These can be handled more efficiently by a 
permanent internal group of specialists and administrative staff. Specific aspects of 
management support can be contracted out or delegated to external groups (such as in the 
case of the Candidate Information Service). 
It is not obvious from the above what an optimal central structure would look like under a clean 
slate approach. However, some tentative conclusions on structural characteristics seem to emerge from 
the analysis presented: 
l Internal vs. external. As expected, there is a clear need for strong internal efforts 
directed, at the minimum, towards administrative and management support and resource 
mobilization tasks. Each of the other functions also requires significant internal effort, 
which, in most cases, can be enhanced by external inputs. 
l Technical vs. policy. There is need for both specialized technical inputs and policy (or 
science policy) skills. It is not entirely obvious what proportion of each needs to be 
external. 
l Continuous vs. occasional effort. The importance of comprehensive and up-to-date 
knowledge has been emphasized several times, highlighting the need for continuous, 
sustained involvement. Part-time or occasional effort is required mostly for specialized 
technical tasks. 
Structural Options 
The weight of the points made regarding the structural implications of CGIAR’s key central 
functions appears to be in the direction of putting greater emphasis than at present on internal efforts, as 
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opposed to external. Also, policy-based inputs with a fair degree of continuity seem to be needed in both 
internal and external efforts. 
When these are translated into broad institutional. considerations four structural options emerge, 
each reflecting some combination of the three dimensions examined above: internal vs. external, 
technical vs. policy, continuous vs. occasional. These are the following: 
Option 1: No change. This is the status auo option. 
Option 2: A radically smaller TAC. This option maintains an external advisory body, but 
one made up of six world-class scientists who can address policy concerns. . 
Option 3: A Policy Advisory CounciI. This option reflects a more continuous, hands-on, 
policy-oriented external advisory input than at present. In terms of size, the 
Council is smaller than the present TAC. 
Option 4: A strong secretariat augmented by ad hoc external technical panels. This 
option advocates having no permanent external structure. It places premium on 
continuous, hands-on, policy-oriented effort by an internal unit. 
Under Option 1 the present two-secretariat arrangement would continue. Under Options 2 and 
3 the smaller TAC or the Policy Advisory Council could be supported by a single secretariat or two 
secretariats. As the issue of a single vs. two secretariats is not as critical a question as the first order 
structural concerns covered by the above listed options, it is treated separately in the next section. 
Okon 1. No change. This would maintain the present arrangements, with a TAC and two 
secretariats. It would involve some modification of TAC’s current responsibilities in the light of the 
mandates of the newly created Finance and Oversight Committees in order to avoid duplication. It may 
also involve some changes in the manner in which members are orientated towards the CGIAR. 
Okon 2. A RadicaIIv smaller TAC. Under this alternative TAC would consist of six world 
class scientists with management experience and insights into the development process. The scientists 
would have distinguished themselves in their respective specialties, but who in addition would have broad 
experience in priority setting, research management, and development strategy. 
TAC would be supported by ad hoc panels of leading experts in various fields, appointed 
individually, and served by a professional staff (which may be in a separate TAC Secretariat or in a 
single CGIAR Secretariat; see discussion in the next section). The panels could be convened as 
individuals, specialized panels, or as multidisciplinary panels. Their reports would ensure depth of 
knowledge and breadth of subject matter coverage. They would set out key issues and options which 
would be a basic input into TAC’s deliberations. 
The Secretariat would handle much of the detailed work that is presently carried out by TAC. 
Thus, TAC would be composed of broad-gauged individuals who can apply general principles which they 
have mastered, enhanced with specialized insights from the panels, to the analysis of issues faced by the 
CGIAR. An important characteristic of TAC members would be their ability to identify leading experts 
from professional contacts, international activities, the scientific literature, etc. 
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Option 3. PoIicv Advisorv CotmeiI. Under this alternative, TAC would be replaced by a Policy 
Advisory Council, made up of 10 or so members appointed by the CGIAR. The Council would provide 
advice to the CGIAR on all matters of system policy, including scientific, institutional, and ecoregional. 
A major responsibility of the Council would be to advise the CGIAR on better ways of integrating efforts 
across centers. 
About half the members would be chosen for their excellence in a major area of CGIAR activity, 
e.g., germplasm conservation, germplasm improvement, natural resource management, policy, 
strengthening of NARSs. The other half would be selected for their expertise on the agricultural research 
issues of specific priority ecoregions. Thus, according to the recommendations of TAC which are 
currently before the CGIAR, the Policy Advisory Council could be made up of 11 members covering five 
CGIAR activity categories and six priority ecoregions. 
Option Q:’ A strorm secretariat augmented bv ad hoc external technical paneIs. Under this 
option there would be one central support unit in the CGIAR, housing a strong group of specialists and 
administrative staff. Ad hoc panels of external technical experts would be assembled, when such 
expertise is required, by the secretariat under the guidance of the committees of the CGIAR. 
More specifically, under this option vision and strategy matters would be addressed by a team 
brought together by the secretariat from within and without the system. Analysis of priorities would be 
conducted by the secretariat based on capacities of existing institutions like FAO, IFPRI and the World 
Bank. Structural matters would be analyzed by the secretariat for discussion by the CGIAR committees. 
The core group of specialists in the single secretariat would be highly knowledgeable about the centers 
and the system and would serve as a resource in integrating efforts across the system. Center reviews 
would continue to be handled through external panels. The secretariat would carry out the background 
work needed by the Finance Committee on resource allocation. And, constituency building and resource 
mobilization functions would benefit from the added strength of the single secretariat. 
The Question of One versus Two Secretariats 
The current division of labor between TAC/TAC Secretariat and the CGIAR Secretariat hr 
evolved over time: the CGIAR Secretariat takes major responsibility for administrative, fina&& 
management, and information matters, supported by limited scientific expertise, and TAC (includix~ 10 
Secretariat) for scientific, technical, and programmatic areas. Checks and balances are built in ud tht 
lines dividing the CGIAR Secretariat’s responsibilities from those of TAC are not sharp. Mosl of tbt 
operational services needed by the CGIAR are provided by the CGIAR Secretariat. The CGIM 
Secretariat and TAC share the workload in carrying out most of the policy support activities n&cd by 
the CGIAR. For example, in policy formulation, the CGIAR Secretariat focuses on financial and overall 
management strategies and policies which complement TAC’s work on .scientific and progMlrww 
strategies and policies. In resource allocation, the CGIAR Secretariat works with TAC in the fornu&on 
of TAC’s recommendation to the CGIAR. In the area of accountability, the external reviews o( dr 
centers are jointly planned and managed. 
The services of the TAC Secretariat and the CGIAR Secretariat could be conceivably mrdrcmd 
into a single secretariat. There could be at least three sub-options: 1) combining the two m 
under World Bank auspices in Washington; 2) combining the two secretariats under World Bank v 
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but maintaining a presence in both Washington and Rome; and 3) withdrawing the two secretariats from 
affiliation with either co-sponsor and combining them at some place other than Washington or Rome. 
In case a model such as Option 4 is adopted by the CGIAR, there would be no permanent 
external advisory committee and, thus, no secretariat dedicated to that committee. Under such a scenario 
it might be desirable to outpost some staff of the systems secretariat at FAO, so that the CGIAR continues 
its links with FAO’s programs and initiatives and can take full advantage of the technical capacities of 
FAO. 
Conclusions 
The Oversight Committee is of the view that the CGIAR’s future success will depend on its 
ability to manage change effectively and that this will depend, in large measure, on the capacity of its 
central structure. The Committee has laid out its initial thinking on this subject in this paper and would 
like reactions from the CGIAR before developing more concrete proposals in this area. Thus, the 
Oversight Committee suggests that individuals within the system who wish to share their views on 
this subject with the Committee should send their comments to Mr. Paul Egger, Chairman, before 
December 1993. In addition, the Committee recommends that the CGIAR and the Co-sponsors 
exercise caution in making new appointments to TAC and the Secretariats in order not to limit 
future StafEi options. 
